PUNISHMENT BY ANALOGY IN NATIONAL SOCIALIST PENAL LAW LAWRENCE PREUSS'
By an act of June 28, 1935, which has been hailed as "a milestone on the road to a National Socialist penal law," 2 the Government of the Reich has provided that:
Whoever commits an action which the law declares to be punishable or which is deserving of punishment according to the fundamental idea of a penal law and the sound perception of the people, shall be punished. If no determinate penal law is directly applicable to the action, it shall be punished according to the law, the basic idea of which fits it best. 3 Thus the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, which stood at the very head of the Penal Code of 1871-and was included among the fundamental rights of Germans guaranteed by the Weimar Constitution, 5 has been abolished. The new law permits the judge to impose a penalty for acts which, although not expressly made criminal by the written law, are analogous to acts which are declared to be punishable, provided that they are condemned by the popular sense of right and by the fundamental legal conception upon which the statutory prohibition is based. Originally intended as a protection to the individual against judicial arbitrariness, the principle nulla poena sine lege had, it is claimed, become "the Magna Charta of the criminal." With the law of June 28, Dr. Hans Frank declares, "a development is closed which, on the one hand, forced the judge to formal-juristic decisions unrelated to real life, and, on the other, gave to the criminal 'Department of Political Science, University of iichigan. 2Reichsjuslizkomnnissar Dr. Hans Frank, "Revolution im Strafrecht," V3lkischer Beobachter, July 5, 1935. 3 "Gesetz zur Anderung des Strafgesetzbuchs," Reichsgesetzblatt, I, 839, Art. [8471 the opportunity to slip through the meshes of the law by crafty manoeuvers, and to avoid just punishment." ' The demand for the abolition of the principle nulla poena sine lege has assumed a central importance in all schemes for National Socialist penal law reform. The Denkschrift issued by the Prussian Ministry of Justice in November, 1933, proposed that the future code of the Third Reich should provide that ,acts not expressly made criminal be punishable if they are "morally reprehensible according to the sound perception of the people," and can be subsumed under an analogous offense defined in the written law. A. P. in May, 1935. 9 "In National Socialist penal law," the latter stated, "there can be no formal right or wrong, but only the idea of substantive justice. . . . Every grave violation of the duties of members of the Volk must find is expiation in the penal law."
The National Socialist Weltanschauung requires that the "fetishistic fanaticism" with which liberal German jurists have regarded the "normative dogma" nulla poena sine lege 10 be replaced by a perception of the "higher and more powerful legal truth--nullum crimen sine poena."' This fundamental change has been brought about by the acts of June 28, 1935, and will undoubtedly be incorporated in the new penal code which is now in preparation. In order to free the courts from the "cult of precedent" and to enable them to employ their new discretion for the realization of National Socialist principles, it is further provided that the Supreme Court of the Reich "may depart from a decision which has been made before the present law (of June 28, 1935) sideration, in interpreting the law, to the transformation of the perception of life and the law which has come about through the renovation of the state."' " The insistence of National Socialist jurists upon the elimination of the principle nulla poena sine lege is the expression of a strong reaction against the liberal notion, justified by considerations of individual freedom and legal security," 1 "that the legislator must guarantee to the individual a sphere, free from state interference, within which he may act at discretion, and that such a free-zone is secure only if legislative restrictions are enacted which are applicable to all. This argument ignores the change in point of view which has re-22"Gesetz zur Anderung von Vorschriften des Strafverfahrens und des Gerichtsverfassungsgesetzes. Vom. 28. Juni 1935," Art. 2, RGBI, I, 844.
There has been a marked tendency in National Socialist legislation to give a wide scope to judicial discretion. See, for example, the Prussian "Biuerliches Erbhofrecht." §63 (3), of May 15, 1933, which provides that: "If a question not specially regulated by this law has to be decided, the judge, keeping in mind the purpose of the law and acting within the limits of the obligatory law of the Reich, is to decide as though he himself had to regulate the case as a fair and conscientious legislator." Preiusische Gesetzsamnzlung (1933), 165.
The Denkschrift of the Prussian Ministry of Justice recommended the following provision, which would abolish the principle of the non-retroactivity of the criminal law: "New penal law provisions, which were not yet in force at the time of the commission of the act, are to be applied to the prejudice of the actor if the act was already at that time deserving of punishment according to common convictiorr and was morally reprehensible, or already deserved the determined penalty." Op. cit., 127. This recommendation was rejected by the Official Penal Law Commission of the Reich Ministry of Justice on the ground that the task of determining the point of time at which such a conviction may have arisen would impose an undue burden upon the courts. In cases of grave necessity, the report stated, the Government could enact retroactive statutes, such as the so-called "lex van der Lubbe." Op. cit., 136. Van der Lubbe, the principal defendant in the Reichstag fire case, was convicted and executed under a retroactive statute ("Gesetz fiber Verh~ngung und Vollzug der Todesstrafe. Vom 29. Mirz 1933," RGBI., I, 151) which imposed the death penalty for an offense which, when it was committed, was punishable by imprisonment for ten years to life (see §307, Reiclsstrafgesetzbuch, and §5, "Verordnung zum Schutze von Volk und Staat. Vom 28. Februar 1933," RGBI., I, 83). The law of June 28, 1935 (cited, note 3, par. 1, above), provides that the following shall be inserted in the Reichsstrafgesetzbuch as §2a, par. 1: "The punishability of an act and its penalty are determined according to the law which prevails at the time of the act."
13On the historical origin of the principle india poena, sine lege, see Adolf Schottlaender, "Die geschichtliche Entwicklung des Satzes nulla poena sine lege," Strafrechliche Abhandlungen, Heft 132 (Breslau-Neukirch, 1911), passim; Barbara Ackerman, "Das Analogieverbot im geltenden und zukiinftigen Strafrecht," ibid., Heft 348 (Breslau-Neukirch, 1934) Despite its Latin dress, the principle was unknown to the Roman law. It originated in the rationalistic and humanitarian thought of the Aufkldrungszeit, and found its way into German legislation through the influence of French revolutionary philosophy and the works of the criminalist Anselm von Feuerbach.
suited from the National Socialist Revolution. The individual is no longer the central point of state-interest, but the community. The new state is totalitarian, and therefore cannot tolerate that an individual should abuse his powers and capacities to the injury of the whole people. Consideration for legal security ought not go so far as to permit -acts which are contrary to the obvious intent of the statute, although not included in its letter."' 14 The liberal and positivist conception of formal justice, which placed the individual in the foreground, must be replaced by the National Socialist idea of material justice, which demands that all acts contrary to the interests of the people and state be punished, even though they cannot be subsumed under an express statutory provision.'
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The law must be interpreted broadly in the light of present legal and political values. and, whenever an 'act injurious to the Volk is not laid under a penal sanction, must be extended by analogy. "For the authoritative aim of the statute is not the will of the historical legislator, but the living, continuously developed will of the present day. . . . We cannot assume that the Leadership would permit laws to continue to exist if they must be interpreted in the liberal spirit of 1870 or 1879. The fact that such laws are allowed to exist today is, on the contrary, proof that they have been inwardly transformed and that it is possible to import into them the new spirit. The leadership-principle requires that the will of the present legislator be obeyed. It follows, therefore, that the application of the law goes beyond the letter of the statute (Gesetz), and must include analogy from the statute. "' 16 It is undeniable that there is a measure of justification in National Socialist strictures upon the juridical formalism which has marked past decisions of the German courts, and particularly of the Reichsgericht, in criminal cases. The extreme reaction against the principle "Law (Gesetz)," Schmitt states, "is for us no longer an abstract norm, resting upon a past will; law is the plan and will of the Leader. As a plan, the law is directed toward the present and future and supersedes . . . the false and incorrect divorce of past and present which was decisive for the theory and practice of the former conception of law. . . ." "Die Rechtswissenschaft im Fiihrerstaat," 2 Zeitschrift der Akademie fir Deutsches Recht (1935), 439. nulla poena sine lege is in large part attributable to the excessively narrow construction which the courts have placed upon the letter of the law in the interests of legal security. Resort to analogy has been rigorously excluded whenever it might affect the defendant adversely, and interpretations have been adopted which are manifestly at variance with the purpose of the law. In an oft-cited decision of May 1, 1899, the Reichsgericht held that the unauthorized tapping of an electric power line did not constitute theft within the meaning of §242 of the Penal Code, since electricity is a "force" (Kraft), and not a "thing" (Sache) 1 This gap in the law was filled by a statute of April 9, 1900, which expressly made punishable the theft of electricity by means of a "conductor" (Leiter) attached to a power line.-Nevertheless, in a decision of December 8, 1933, the Reichsgericht held that the operation of an automatic telephone by means of altered coins did not constitute an offense under this law, since it was accomplished by technical means not contemplated therein. 9 The laws of June 28, 1935, are designed to prevent the recurrence of such decisions and to bring the jurisprudence of the courts into harmony with the "German legal conscience."
Under the legislation the courts will be able to resort to Gesetzesanalogie, that is to say, they may apply the legal idea upon which a determined statute is based to analogous cases, provided that the act in question is condemned by the "sound perception of the people." Whether they may resort to Rechtsanalogie, that is, to "the application of a principle underlying the entire legislative system to an unregulated case which corresponds to this fundamental principle," is controverted among National Socialist jurists.
2 0 The direct application of Recht, independently of the text of a statute, would, some assert, lead to a violation of the leadership-principle. The exclusion of Rechtsanalogie would, for example, prevent the extension the people," as an expression of the National Socialist Weltanschauung, is indeed "Recht," but it must be formulated and concretized as statute before it can become a binding rule for the judge. There is need for a "clear line," to be established by the Leader whenever he deems that the legal conscience of the Volk requires that certain acts be punishable. Legal opinion, however, is not unanimously agreed that Rechtsanalogie is excluded, and it may be expected that the lower courts, at least, will draw upon the general principles of the National Socialist Rechtsanschauung in the decision of criminal cases. The numerous convictions for "racial defilement," even before the adoption of the "Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor," September, 15, 1935, can be explained only upon the assumption that such a practice had already been established. Dr. Roland Freisler, on the other hand. maintains that "Law created by analogy, upon the basis of the National Socialist conception of the people, does not violate the principle of the authoritarian state, for the authoritarian state wills to be nothing other than the function, the vital expression of the conception of the people." Denkschrift (cited. note 6 above), 11.
22 The "Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und deutschen Ehre. Vom 15. September 1935," RGBL, I, 1146) prohibits, under severe penalties, marriage and extramarital intercourse between "Jews and nationals of German or related blood."
See the decision of the Landesgericht of Kbnigsberg, August 26, 1935, in which "mixed marriages" were held to be forbidden, prior to the enactment of a specific statutory prohibition, on the following grounds: "The jurisprudence of the courts is the servant of the Volk no less than eyery other state activity. It sees its duty and fulfillment in active collaboration in the creation of foundations for the new racial and political structure of the Reich. Only from this point of view is a true jurisprudence possible. An absolute law, divorced from the notion of the national community . . . is unthinkable. The National Socialist State is built upon the idea of national-racial unity. Maintenance of the purity of the race is the first requirement for the victory of the new conception of the state. A marriage which does violence to this idea cannot be approved by the legal order of the national-racial state (vlkischer Staat). Even in the absence of a legislative regulation, it is not comprised in the provisions of the Civil Code," which can relate only "to such marriages as correspond by their nature to the ideology of our national legal order, and are fundamentally approved by it." Not only is the letter of the law important, the Court stated, but also, "the legal consciousness rooted in the Volk is of no lesser importance, even if it has not yet gained form through drafting and proclamation." 40 Deutsche J.uristenZeitung (1935) , 1289.
In a case decided on July 12, 1934, however, the Reichsgericht had refused to annul a marriage between an "Aryan" and a "non-Aryan," on the ground that the courts are not authorized, in advance of express legislation, to apply to an unregulated case the general principles underlying the legislation on race. "The courts are not called upon," the opinion states, "to extend National Socialist views beyond the bounds which the legislation of the National Socialist state itself has drawn. It is of decisive importance, in this connection, that the legislation of the National Socialist Government upon the race question has not, by a long way, realized all the requirements of the National Socialist program." Since the laws which impose certain disabilities upon "non-Aryans" are silent upon the subject of "mixed marriages," it is to be assumed that there was no Punishment without a written law is not only a requirement of the National Socialist program for penal law reform; it has its deeper roots in the National Socialist Rechtsanschauung, which conceives of law as an "expression of the racial soul.1
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In the "vdlkischer Staat," 2 ' "the final and most profound source of law is the conviction of the people and the organically developing popular legal conscience" ;25 the basis of legal obligation lies in the "harmony between moral valuation, the sense of duty and the perception of law. " 26 The state cannot create law arbitrarily, but can only formulate it and give to it ', coercive sanction. State legislation (Gesetz) is law only because it is the expression of Recht, the living law of the Germanic racial community or Volksgerneinschat.
7
Substantively illegal action, therefore, is action against the National Socialist Weltanschauung, which is conceived as the purest expression of the Germanic spirit.
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Recht is transformed into Gesetz by the command of the Leader, in whom, by definition, the will of people and state are united. On the National Socialist conception of racial law, see Helmut Nicolai, "Die rassengesetzliche Rechtslehre," Nationalsozialistische Bibliothek, Heft 39 (Munich, 1932) , passim; Erik Wolf, "Das Rechtsideal des Nationalsozialistischen Staates," 28 Archiv fur Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie (1935) , 348-363; and L. Preuss, "Germanic Law versus Roman Law in National Socialist Legal Theory," 16 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law (1934), 269-280. 2 4On the conception of the "v5lkischer Staat," see Julius Binder, "Der deutsche Volksstaat," Recht und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Nr. 110 (Tilbingen, 1934) , passin; Reinhard H6hn, "Staat und Rechtsgemeinschaft," 95 Zeitschrift fir die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (1935), 656-690; and Carl Dernedde, "V6lkischer, totaler und authoritirer Staat," 63 .uristische Wochenschrift (1934), 955-959. 25 Friedrich Schaffstein, "Nationalsozialistisches Strafrecht," 53 Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (1935) , 607.
2 6"Nationalsozialistische Leitsitze ffir ein neues deutsches Strafrecht," r'lkLscher Beobachter, May 7, 1935. Also, Heinrich Lange, "Justizreform und deutscher Richter," Deutscher Juristentag (Berlin, 1933), 186. 27 "Law," Reichsju.stizminster Dr. Girtner states, "cannot be invented or devised; one cannot renew it in the sense that one can renew the fagade of a building, for law has the force of its validity only externally in the authority of the legislator-that is, only in so far as the state by intervening can enforce its validity. The vital root of law, however, reaches down into the secret depths of the popular conscience and thence supplies it with its inner validity and affirmation." "Zur Erneuerung des deutschen Rechts," Deutsche Justiz, November 9, 1933, p. 622 
